Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests: Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the Corssroads by Bhagwat, Ashutosh
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND COMPELLING INTERESTS:
EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS
Ashutosh Bhagwa(
In the last few years we have witnessed a string of important deci-
sions by the federal courts of appeals addressing the constitutionality
of benign, race-conscious governmental actions. Though all apply
the "strict scrutiny" standard of review mandated by recent decisions
of the Supreme Court, the appellate courts have reached strikingly
different conclusions regarding the permissibility of race-conscious
government decision making. Underlying these decisions, moreover,
is a disagreement regarding the very nature of strict scrutiny review:
some courts view it as requiring an essentially ad hoc assessment of
the importance of, and need for, race-conscious measures, while oth-
ers view the doctrine as imposing much more severe constraints on
governmental power. The disagreement has not been resolved by the
Supreme Court, and indeed points to a deep-seated ambiguity and
tension within the Court's opinions. This Article looks at the nature
of the theoretical divisions that underlie these appellate decisions,
and more broadly, their implications for equal protection theory.
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE COURTS
A. The Supreme Court and Standards of Review
When historians look back on the Rehnquist Court, there are two
aspects of its jurisprudence that are likely to be deemed pathbreak-
ing. First, and probably foremost, is the Rehnquist Court's resurrec-
tion of federalism-based limits on congressional authority. The ex-
tensive caselaw has dominated both the docket and headlines in
recent years. Relevant decisions range from reinterpretations of the
Commerce Clause,' to narrow constructions of Section 5 of the Four-
.Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would like to
thank all of the participants at the Journal of Constitutional Law Symposium, including espe-
cially Professors Deborah Hellman and C. Edwin Baker, for very valuable feedback on this pa-
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'See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Commerce Clause did
not provide Congress ith authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act); United States v.
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teenth Amendment,2 to expansions of state sovereign immunity,' and
the discovery of nontextual, federalism-based limits on congressional
power to regulate states as states.4 Today most commentators, both
scholarly and otherwise, seem to agree that the New Federalism is the
great innovation of the Rehnquist Court. If one looks back a few
years, however, to the summer of 1995, the picture was quite differ-
ent. Certainly federalism was on the Court's agenda-after all, United
States v. Lopez had just been decided, and New York v. United States was
already on the books. The long-term significance of these decisions,
however, was far from clear, and it is fair to say that no one expected
the surge in judicial activism that we have seen in the past few years.
Indeed, many would have said that the most important recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court were not in the federalism area at all, but
instead were two decisions addressing race-conscious government ac-
tion: City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,5 and Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena.6 These decisions together established that all race-conscious
governmental actions, whether state or federal, benign or discrimina-
tory, when challenged under the Equal Protection Clause7 were sub-
ject to the highest standard of constitutional review, strict scrutiny,
which Gerald Gunther famously described as "'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact."8 To observers, therefore, these decisions very possibly
spelled the end of all governmental affirmative action programs. If
one had asked commentators at that time what the "legacy' of the
Rehnquist Court was likely to be, they would probably have pointed
to these decisions.
To understand the significance of the Croson and Adarand deci-
sions, it is necessary to take a step back and remember where the law
in this area stood just ten years earlier. As of that time, the Burger
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause).
' SeeKimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding of immunity for states in age
discrimination suits); Monison, 529 U.S. at 598; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(holding that Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded congressional authority).
' See Kime4 528 U.S. at 62; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (prohibiting Congress from
subjecting states to suit in state courts without their consent); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (barring Congress from removing states' immunity under Indian Commerce
Clause authority).
' See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (disallowing congressional mandate that
forced state officers to execute federal background check laws); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (rejecting provision of federal law forcing states to "take title" of radioactive
waste).
5 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
6 515 U.S. 200 (1995), cert. granted sub nom. Adarand v. Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 122 S. Ct. 511 (2001).
7 To be precise, in the case of federal programs, the challenges were premised on the
"equal protection component" of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
8 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); but seeAdarand, 515 U.S. at 237 ("[W]e wish
to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'").
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Court had issued three important decisions considering the constitu-
tionality of benign, race-conscious governmental actions: Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,9 Fullilove v. Klutznick,' and Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education." In none of these three decisions was the
Court able to produce a majority opinion, or even to agree on what
the relevant constitutional analysis should be. In toto, therefore,
these opinions produced profound confusion regarding the circum-
stances under which governments were permitted to engage in race-
conscious decision making, and regarding the standard of constitu-
tional review applicable to such decisions. There were hints in cer-
tain opinions-notably Justice Powell's separate opinion in Bakke and
his plurality opinion in Wygant-that at least with respect to state race-
conscious action, the standard should be strict scrutiny, but in none
of these cases was a majority of the Court able to come to agreement.
This doctrinal uncertainty was put to rest during the first decade
of the Rehnquist Court. First, in Croson, a clear majority of the Court
agreed that whatever the rule for federal programs, all race-conscious
decisions by state governments (and their subdivisions) must be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny.2  Then, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,"s a
quite different majority of the Court held that benign race-conscious
measures created by Congress are subject only to "intermediate scru-
tiny," once again resolving the doctrinal uncertainty of the Burger
Court. Finally, in Adarand the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting and
extended the strict scrutiny standard to all race-conscious govern-
mental actions, whether adopted by the federal government or by
state governments.
14
Since the Adarand decision in 1995, the Court has issued no sig-
nificant decisions regarding affirmative action or other benign, race-
conscious governmental programs.'5 This deafening silence stands in
9 In Bakke, the Court struck down a special admissions program at the Medical School of
the University of California at Davis, which set aside a specified portion of seats at the Medical
School for members of ethnic minority groups who were "from economically and/or educa-
tionally disadvantaged backgrounds." 438 U.S. 265, 272 n.1 (1978).
0 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove the Court upheld a federal program that set aside ten
percent of funds awarded to support local public works projects, requiring that such funds be
used to procure goods or services from minority-owned businesses.
" 476 U.S. 267 (1986). In Wygant, the Court struck down a provision of a collective bargain-
ing agreement between a local school board and a teachers' union that granted preferential
protection against layoffs, under certain circumstances, to racial minorities.
" 488 U.S. at 493-94 (plurality opinion); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Admittedly, the Croson Court also did not produce a single, majority opinion, but unlike in ear-
lier cases, there were five unambiguous votes for a particular standard of review, and a majority
of the Court did join the portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion applying the strict scrutiny
standard. In both of these respects, the decision reflects a clear departure from the legal uncer-
tainty of the Burger Court decisions.
, 497 U.S. 547,564-65 (1990).
" Adarand 515 U.S. at 235 ("Federal racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a
compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.").
'5 The Court has decided a number of cases challenging the constitutionality of race-based
redistricting. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
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stark contrast to both the stream of federalism-related cases re-
counted above, and to the Court's continued activism in other areas
of equal protection jurisprudence. Apparently, the Supreme Court
believes that once the constitutional standard of review for race-
conscious programs was settled, the law was clear and therefore the
Court's work in this area was done. However, an examination of re-
cent decisions by the federal courts of appeals reveals widespread dis-
agreement and confusion regarding the constitutionality of race-
conscious official action. Despite facial unanimity regarding the ap-
plicable standard of review, courts differ widely in how they imple-
ment the strict scrutiny standard. In particular, there is an explicit
and widening division among the courts of appeals regarding the
kinds of governmental objectives that are sufficiently "compelling" to
justify race-conscious actions that disfavor the majority race, a division
the Supreme Court has studiously avoided resolving. A study of this
caselaw seriously undermines the Supreme Court's confidence that
the law in this area is settled.17 More fundamentally, the caselaw also
brings into question the wisdom and value of the Court's continued
reliance on tiered standards of review as the crucial component of its
equal protection jurisprudence, without any examination or explica-
tion of what those tiers of review mean in practice. It is to this caselaw
that I will now turn.
B. The Courts of Appeals and the Search for Compelling Interests
As noted above, since the Supreme Court's decisions in Croson
and Adarand, there have been a number of cases decided by the
United States Courts of Appeals addressing the constitutionality of
race-conscious governmental programs. In all of these cases, the de-
ciding court has applied the prevailing "strict scrutiny" standard
mandated by the Supreme Court, which requires that to survive con-
stitutional review, a racial classification "must serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that in-
terest.""8 The courts have diverged in determining precisely what
(1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). In my opinion, however, those cases raise quite dif-
ferent issues from traditional affirmative action cases.
"' See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001) (holding that imposition of different re-
quirements for citizenship depending on whether citizen parent is mother or father is consis-
tent with equal protection principles); Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 234; Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420
(1998); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996).
' I have noted elsewhere that there might be reasons, rooted in the peculiar institutional
structure of the Supreme Court, why the Court has focused unduly on choosing a "standard of
review," while ignoring the practical implementation and consequences of its jurisprudence.
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal? The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Na-
ture of the 7udidalPower, "80 B.U. L. REV. 967,978-80,993-1002 (2000).
S Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235.
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sorts of governmental objectives qualify as sufficiently "compelling" to
justify race-conscious official decision making. In particular, courts
have differed over whether the universe of such compelling interests
is limited (perhaps only to one interest), or whether it is open-ended.
This is obviously a critical question, because governments are flatly
forbidden from using racial criteria in their actions absent a compel-
ling justification (though even if supported by a compelling interest,
the governmental program must still be narrowly tailored), and so a
limited universe of compelling interests would severely restrict gov-
ernments' abilities to take explicit account of race.
The leading case for the restrictive view of compelling interests is
unquestionably Hopwood v. Texas,'9 decided by the Fifth Circuit in
1996. Hopwood involved an equal protection challenge to the admis-
sions policy of the University of Texas Law School, which granted
preferential treatment to applicants who belonged to specified mi-
nority groups (to be precise, African-Americans and Mexican-
Americans). The Fifth Circuit struck down the law school's admis-
sions policy, relying on two holdings. First, the court held that diver-
sity-that is, achieving a diverse student body-simply did not qualify
as a compelling governmental interest for equal protection purposes.
Relying on various statements from plurality and dissenting Supreme
Court opinions, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a majority of the Su-
preme Court had rejected diversity as a compelling interest, and in-
deed suggested that perhaps the only governmental interest suffi-
ciently compelling to justify the use of race was remedying the
present effects of prior discrimination by that governmental body.2'
Second, the court held that the law school could not establish a com-
pelling interest in remedying past discrimination because it could not
demonstrate any present effects of past discrimination by the law
school.2  The crucial, and most controversial, holding in Hpwood,
however, was the first: as a matter of law, diversity does not qualify as a
compelling governmental interest. 3
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
" Id. at 934.
Id. at 944-46. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that in Bakke, Justice Powell had indicated
that diversity did constitute a compelling governmental interest, but held that "Justice Powell's
view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue." Id. at 944. In a subsequent appeal in the
Hopwood case, the Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed this aspect of its Hopwood holding under the
law of the case doctrine because the holding "did not rise to the level of clear error...." Hop-
wood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 275 (5th Cir. 2000).
" Id. at 955. In the course of reaching this conclusion, the court also rejected the view that
the law school was permitted to adopt race-conscious measures in order to remedy discrimina-
tion by larger governmental bodies, such as the State of Texas or the University of Texas as a
whole.
' One of the three judges issued a concurring opinion declining to join the majority's




Other than the Fifth Circuit, the only other court that has come
close to adopting such a restrictive view of compelling governmental
interests is the District of Columbia Circuit, in Lutheran Church-
Missouri Synod v. FCC.24 In Lutheran Church, a church that ran two ra-
dio stations challenged FCC regulations requiring radio stations to
maintain affirmative action hiring programs for women and minori-
ties. The justification offered by the FCC for its regulations was the
desire to foster diverse programming content, which the court under-
stood to mean programming that reflects minority tastes and view-
points.' The court rejected this justification and struck down the
regulations, holding that the government lacked any compelling in-
terest in encouraging racially-connected diversity in broadcast pro-
gramming content. In so concluding, the court relied on some of the
same Supreme Court opinions cited by the Hopwood court.26 The
court also held that even if a compelling interest in diversity did exist,
the FCC's broad affirmative action requirements were not narrowly
tailored to achieve that goal. Like the Hopwood court, therefore, the
Lutheran Church court adopted a narrow view of the kinds of govern-
mental interests that can qualify as compelling, rejecting in particular
any compelling interest in racial "diversity." The D.C. Circuit did not,
however, go as far as did the Hopwood court in suggesting that only
remedial interests qualify as sufficiently compelling to sustain race-
conscious governmental programs.
In contrast to Hopwood and Lutheran Church, three other circuits
have recognized a broader range of governmental interests compel-
ling enough to justify race-conscious decision making. The first such
decision is Wittmer v. Peters, 7 decided by the Seventh Circuit in 1996.
Illinois ran a "boot camp" program for young, nonviolent criminal
offenders, designed to reduce jail time and reform the inmates. The
prison adopted a racial preference in hiring officers for the camp,
hiring African-Americans over white candidates who scored higher
on the hiring test. The justification provided for the racial prefer-
ence was that because sixty-eight percent of the program's inmates
were African-American, the boot camp's program of "pacification and
reformation" could not be successful without a reasonable proportion
of African-Americans among the supervisory staff, and that without
racial preferences such a reasonable proportion could not be
achieved. In an opinion by Judge Posner, the court accepted this ar-
gument, citing expert testimony presented by the prison supporting
its position.28 Along the way, Judge Posner rejected as dicta any
"4 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also MD/DC/DE Broad. Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (striking down successor to FCC rule struck down in Lutheran Church, but on narrow
tailoring grounds).
Lutheran Church, 141 F.3d at 354.
Id at 354-55.
87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
Id at 920-21.
Jan. 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
statements by the Supreme Court (and by the Fifth Circuit in Hop-
wood) suggesting that only remedial interests could be sufficiently
compelling to justify race-based actions.29 In reaching that conclu-
sion, the court pointed out that surely "separation of the races in a
prison that was undergoing a race riot would not violate the Constitu-
tion," and that therefore the universe of possible compelling interests
was not so limited.30 Instead, all that was required was that the chal-
lenged governmental action be "motivated by a truly powerful and
worthy concern.... "3' In other words, the Seventh Circuit treated
the identification of compelling governmental interests as an ad hoc
question of public policy, rather than as an abstract legal question.
Another recent case adopting a broad, ad hoc policy approach
towards compelling interests is the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in
Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the University of California.32 Hunter in-
volved admissions to an elementary school operated by the Graduate
School of Education and Information Studies of the University of
California at Los Angeles. The school took explicit account of race
and ethnicity (as well as other factors) in making admissions deci-
sions, and this was challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.3 The court upheld the program under a strict scrutiny analy-
sis, holding in particular that the University had a compelling interest
in "operating a research-oriented elementary school," and therefore
the school was justified in using racial criteria in admissions to ensure
that the student body at the school provided an appropriately repre-
sentative and diverse sample for research purposes. Along the way,
the court rejected any notion that "only an interest in remedying past
discrimination can justify" governmental use of race, stating that the
"Supreme Court has never held that only a state's interest in remedial
action can meet strict scrutiny."35 The court then went on, like the
Wittmer court, to treat the question of which governmental objectives
qualify as "compelling" as one requiring an open-ended assessment of
the strength of a public policy, which in this case turned on the im-
portance of education to the functions of local and state govern-
ments. The court also concluded that the admissions policy was nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the school's compelling interest, and so
upheld the school's policies.36 A dissenting opinion by Judge Beezer
Id. at 919.
S'Id.
" Id. at 918.
190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877 (2000).
Id. at 1062-63.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1064 n.6.
Id. at 1067. The Ninth Circuit recently held (consistent with its Hunter opinion) that di-
versity was a compelling interest sufficient to justify race-based admissions at the University
level, but on the narrow grounds that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke constituted binding




disagreed with the majority on both aspects of its analysis, and argued
in favor of the Hopwood/Lutheran Church position that nonremedial
interests could never be sufficiently compelling to justify race-
conscious decision making by the government.37
Finally, in Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School Districtss the Sec-
ond Circuit considered the constitutionality of a voluntary interdis-
trict transfer program among a group of New York State school dis-
tricts, which restricted transfers based on the race of the student.
Specifically, the program permitted only minority students to transfer
from Rochester, an urban, predominantly minority school district, to
a neighboring suburban district, and permitted only white students to
transfer into the Rochester district from the suburbs. The stated
purpose of the program was to reduce "racial isolation" within the
various school systems,3 9 so the court was forced to consider whether
reducing racial isolation (or as the court put it, reducing de facto
segregation) could qualify as a compelling governmental interest. Af-
ter reviewing the relevant caselaw, including the Hopwood and Wittmer
decisions as well as cases from the Supreme Court, the court con-
cluded that current law did not limit compelling interests to the re-
medial setting, and that, in fact, binding authority from the Second
Circuit explicitly recognized the desire to reduce de facto segregation
as a compelling governmental interest justifying race-conscious ac-
tions. 0 Ultimately, the court reversed a preliminary injunction
granted to the plaintiff, and remanded the case to the district court
for a factual determination of whether the challenged program fit
within the rationale of the earlier circuit precedent. Thus, like the
Seventh Circuit in Wittmer and the Ninth Circuit in Hunter, the Sec-
ond Circuit explicitly rejected the notion that remedying past dis-
crimination was the only compelling governmental interest that
could justify decisions based on race. It should be noted, however,
that by treating its precedent as binding on this issue, the Second
Circuit clearly treated the existence of a compelling interest as at
least in part a legal question, and thus not an entirely ad hoc inquiry
into public policy."1
The five decisions discussed above-Hopwood, Lutheran Church,
Wittmer, Hunter, and Brewer-represent the most explicit attempts in
recent years by the United States Courts of Appeals to wrestle with
the vexing issue of identifying the range of possible compelling inter-
" Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1070-73 (BeezerJ., dissenting). Judge Beezer cited a number of cases
from other circuits that purport to limit compelling interests to the remedial setting, id. at 1070-
71, but with the exception of Hopwood and Lutheran Church, most of those statements are proba-
bly best understood as dicta.
212 F.d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 742.
aId at 747-49.
" See id. at 750 ("[We held [in previous decisions] that, as a matter of law, the state has a
compelling interest in ensuring that schools are relatively integrated.").
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ests in the equal protection context.4 2 A number of other recent cir-
cuit court opinions have circled around this question, but have de-
clined to adopt definitive positions (preferring instead to resolve the
cases before them on narrow tailoring grounds) .4 Two decisions are
illustrative. In Wessmann v. Gittens,44 the First Circuit was faced with a
challenge to race-based admissions policies at the Boston Latin
School, a magnet school within the Boston public school system. The
court considered, but declined to adopt, the argument that "remedy-
ing past discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-
conscious action by the government," rejecting any statements in the
caselaw to that effect as dictum.45  The court also declined to adopt
the Hopwood position that diversity will never qualify as a compelling
interest, concluding that the caselaw on this point remained unset-
tled. Instead, the court concluded that as a factual matter, the de-
fendants in Wessmann had failed to demonstrate that their policies
really advanced diversity in any meaningful way. Similarly, in Tuttle
v. Arlington County School Board,47 the Fourth Circuit struck down a
race-based admissions policy for a public school (in this case, an "al-
ternative kindergarten") designed to achieve "racial, ethnic, and so-
cioeconomic diversity." Like the Wessmann court, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the question of "whether diversity is a compelling
governmental interest" is inconclusive under both Supreme Court
precedent and most circuit court opinions (with the notable excep-
tion of Hopwood). The court itself declined to resolve the question,
striking down the admissions policy instead on narrow tailoring
grounds.48
" Several recent district court decisions have, however, explicitly addressed this issue. In the
context of a challenge to undergraduate admissions practices at the University of Michigan, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan adopted the Wittmer/Hunter view that
compelling interests were not limited to the remedial setting, and indeed that diversity could
constitute a compelling interest. Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 811,821-22, (E.D. Mich. 2000)
("[A]pplicable Supreme Court precedent has never held [that remedying past discrimination]
is the only compelling state interest that can ever justify racial classification."). On the other
hand, another court in the same district, addressing a challenge to race-based admissions poli-
cies at the University of Michigan Law School, adopted precisely the opposite position, holding
that diversity is not a compelling interest, and further that remedying past discrimination was
the only permissible justification for race-based governmental action. See Grutter v. Bollinger,
137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 848-49 (E.D. Mich. 2001), stay granted, 247 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2001). Pre-
sumably the Sixth Circuit will soon resolve this split in authority.
4' In this respect, the courts of appeals have imitated the tendencies of the Supreme Court.
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 307-08
(1997). I have elsewhere suggested that the judicial focus on means scrutiny raises issues of
both competence and legitimacy. Id. at 321-22.
41 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
Id. at 795.
46 Id. at 795-800.
,' 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000).
Id. at 704-05; see alsoJohnson v. Bd. of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2001)
(stating that "we do not decide today whether or when student body diversity may be a compel-
ling interest for purposes of strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause of the
[Vol. 4:2
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Court's jurisprudence and its implications for the structure of equal
protection doctrine.
C. Tiers of Scrutiny and the Court: Less Than Meets the Eye
One of the great, overarching themes of the Supreme Court's ju-
risprudence of individual rights in the past half-century has been the
doctrinal dominance of the concept of "tiers of scrutiny." The famil-
iar three ascending tiers of scrutiny consist of rational basis review,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. From its roots in equal pro-
tection doctrine, and in particular, in the Japanese-American intern-
ment cases of World War H1 ,53 the concept of tiers of scrutiny has
come to dominate the Court's individual rights doctrine, including
free speech law and the law of privacy.54 Remarkably, however, de-
spite its sweeping embrace of the concept of tiered review, the Su-
preme Court has paid essentially no attention to the practical details
of that review. In particular, as numerous commentators have noted,
the Court has failed to develop any coherent framework regarding
how, in applying the tiers of scrutiny, courts are to assess whether the
governmental interest asserted satisfies the requirements of the level
of scrutiny at issue: i.e., is the interest "legitimate" in the context of
rational basis review, is it "important" for intermediate scrutiny, and is
it "compelling" if strict scrutiny is invoked.5 5 Instead, the tiers of scru-
tiny have evolved sub silentio so that the highest level, strict scrutiny,
equates to an almost automatic conclusion of unconstitutionality, 6
and the lowest, rational basis review, leads to an equally likely result
of constitutionality.57 Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand, is
probably best understood as a form of ad hoc balancing, where the
importance of government's proffered interest is weighed against the
See supra note 51.
" For a description of this historical evolution, see Bhagwat, supra note 43, at 303-06.
The commentary is summarized in Bhagwat, supra note 43, at 307-08.
" For some rare counterexamples, see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (holding that
a ban on campaign activity near polling places passes strict scrutiny and therefore does not vio-
late the First Amendment); Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that
forced inclusion of women in a male civic association passes strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment); and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding executive order
that excludedJapanese-Americans from particular areas under strict scrutiny analysis).
57 Again, there are some counterexamples, the most prominent recent example of which is
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), where the Court found no rational basis for a Colorado
amendment that prohibited government measures to prevent discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(finding no rational basis in denying a special use permit for a group home for the mentally
retarded); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (finding no rational basis for
an Alabama statute that gave lower tax rates to Alabama companies); United States Dep't of Ag-
ric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (holding that the Food Stamp Act's discrimination against




The above cases demonstrate a fundamental divide among the
Courts of Appeals regarding the kinds of governmental interests that
can qualify as sufficiently "compelling" to justify race-conscious deci-
sion making.49 This division is unsurprising, given the importance of
the issue and the lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court in
the area. What is surprising, however, is that the federal appellate
decisions discussed above disagree not only on the final legal conclu-
sion regarding what interests are compelling, but also on the funda-
mental methodology that a court should follow in identifying compel-
ling interests. Some courts, such as those in Hopwood and Lutheran
Church, treat the question as an entirely legal one, to be answered by
employing interpretive methodologies and traditional legal tools
such as the use of precedent. Others, notably those in Wittmer and
Hunter, and to some extent Brewer, treat the question as turning on
the government's ability to convince a reviewing court that it needs to
take account of race in order to achieve a worthy public policy objec-
tive. Indeed, Hunter suggests that the worthiness of the goal-in that
case, conducting educational research-is in part a factual question
susceptible to proof.0 This confusion is somewhat surprising given
that the strict scrutiny analysis, and the requirement of "compelling
government interests," are hardly new concepts.5 ' The truth is, how-
ever, that despite its modern emphasis on (even obsession with) tiers
of scrutiny, the Supreme Court has entirely failed to grapple with the
methodological questions of how compelling governmental interests
are to be identified, and how strict scrutiny is to be applied. The cur-
rent state of confusion among the Courts of Appeals in this area thus
reflects a fundamental ambiguity and gap in the very structure of the
Supreme Court's modern equal protection jurisprudence. Astonish-
ingly, however, the Court has shown no interest in addressing this is-
sue and has consistently denied certiorari in cases raising it.52 The
balance of this paper will explore the nature of this lacuna in the
Fourteenth Amendment," but also noting that "[the weight of recent precedent is undeniably
to the contrary"); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1999)
(choosing to leave unresolved question of whether diversity is a compelling governmental in-
terest).
"9 See Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. County of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting that "[w] hether nonremedial justifications for 'reverse discrimination' by a public body
are ever possible is unsettled" and citing cases recognizing division).
190 F.3d at 1063-64.
" The concept of strict scrutiny seems to have made its appearance in the Japanese-
American internment case, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (stating that
race-based categories are "immediately suspect" and therefore "courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny"). The term "compelling government interest" was first introduced in Jus-
tice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshir 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) ("For a citizen to be made to forego even a part of so
basic a liberty as his political autonomy, the subordinating interest of the State must be compel-
ling."). See generally Bhagwat, supra note 43, at 306-07 & nn. 25-27.




burden on individual rights." It is difficult to say why exactly the Su-
preme Court, having articulated and emphasized the importance of
tiered review, has failed to consider in any detail the nature of that
review. I suspect at least part of the explanation lies in the peculiar
institutional nature of the modem Supreme Court, with its exclusive
focus on rulemaking and doctrine at the expense of any awareness or
(apparently) interest in the practical import of the rules it makes.59
Also, there has been no pressing need for the Court to address these
questions because three-tiered review has seemingly plodded along,
without any theoretical framework to support it, because of the im-
plicit understandings described above regarding the practical conse-
quences of each of the tiers. The recent decisions of the Court ex-
tending strict scrutiny review to all race-conscious governmental
decision making, however, have brought this internal tension to a
head, and have forced the courts (albeit to date only the lower
courts) to confront current law's failure to determine exactly what
sorts of governmental interests qualify as "compelling."
The source of the recent crisis in equal protection jurisprudence
is that under the current understanding, the consequence of extend-
ing strict scrutiny to even benign, race-conscious decision making
would be that almost all such governmental programs, including all
set-asides and affirmative action programs, would be flatly unconstitu-
tional. It is clear, however, that large portions of the judiciary (to say
nothing of society at large) are not comfortable with this result. Even
on the Supreme Court, members of the very Adarand majority that
extended strict scrutiny to all federal race-conscious decision making
went out of their way to emphasize that the extension of strict scru-
tiny in that case did not spell the end of all race-based action designed
to benefit minority groups.0 Furthermore, decisions such as Wittmer,
Hunter, and Brewer demonstrate that many lower court judges are also
not willing to accept the most extreme implications of applying strict
scrutiny to benign race-conscious state action. Of course, not all
judges feel this way-the results in Hopwood and Lutheran Church sug-
gest that some federal judges are perfectly comfortable with a legal
regime condemning all race-conscious government actions; but these
judges do not seem to represent any sort of a consensus.6 Thus the
" For a description, and defense, of this form of balancing, see Bhagwat, supra note 43, at
351-55.
"' For a detailed discussion of the institutional peculiarities of the modem Supreme Court,
and their implications for doctrinal development, see generally Bhagwat, supra note 17, at 992-
1003.
' Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995), cert. granted sub nom. Ada-
rand v. Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 122 S. Ct. 511
(2001); cf. 515 U.S. at 239 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) (de-
nying possibility that governments may ever "have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on
the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction").
" It should be noted that the courts that decided the Hopwood and Lutheran Church cases,
the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits respectively, are among the most conservative appel-
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affirmative action cases have forced courts, for the first time, to put
some systematic content into the strict scrutiny standard that has
been in existence for over half a century, and in particular, have
forced the courts to confront the question of how exactly they are to
identify "compelling" governmental interests.
As noted above, two distinct jurisprudential approaches to this
question have emerged among lower court judges: some courts and
judges treat the identification of compelling interests as an ad hoc
policy question, to be determined on a case-by-case basis, while others
treat it as a question of law, requiring interpretation, fidelity to
precedent, and application of principles of stare decisis. The former
approach tends to permit courts to uphold race-conscious programs
that they feel are "worthy," while the latter has generally resulted in
the invalidation of programs, based in part on the view that Supreme
Court precedent permits such programs only for narrow, remedial
62purposes. Both positions can find some support in opinions of the
Supreme Court, but neither has been definitively adopted by the
Court, which has so far failed to confront head-on this underlying,
theoretical issue regarding its tiers of scrutiny. For the time being,
therefore, the debate remains unresolved.
II. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY DEBATE
A. Compelling Interests: Policy or Law?
The ultimate question dividing the courts of appeals in their quest
to identify compelling governmental interests might be stated thus: is
the assessment of whether a particular, proffered governmental in-
terest is or is not compelling at bottom an ad hocjudicial evaluation
of the societal importance of the policy being pursued; or is it a ques-
tion of constitutional law, to be determined through an examination
of precedent, and ultimately through a process of constitutional in-
terpretation? A complete answer to this extraordinarily difficult
question raises profound issues about judicial competence, and the
justifications for the institution of judicial review in the first place,
and so must remain beyond the scope of this Article. A number of
commentators, including myself, have, however, examined these
questions in some detail elsewhere.3 Some of the conclusions
reached there have important implications for the discussion here,
and are worth summarizing briefly.
First, courts are quite bad at the kind of empirical, forward-
looking and predictive analysis required by the means scrutiny prong
late courts in the country.
See supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
This commentary is discussed, and the conclusions that follow are set forth in detail, in
Bhagwat, supra note 43, at 321-25.
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of the Court's strict scrutiny test6 In particular, courts are almost
certainly better at identifying and evaluating governmental purposes
within a legal framework than they are at evaluating the suitability of
governmental "means."
Second, courts are also inherently poorly suited, as an institu-
tional matter, to make ad hoc policy judgments regarding the
strength and worthiness, the "compellingness" as it were, of govern-
mental policy objectives. In our system of government, such judg-
ments are quintessentially the kind which are left to legislatures and
the democratic process. Therefore, when courts second-guess the
importance of governmental objectives, the countermajoritarian dif-
ficulty is raised in its starkest form.
Third, in contrast to the legitimacy problem described above,
courts are actually quite good as a matter of institutional competence at
determining the actual intent underlying governmental actions.
Courts are also well-suited, in terms of both competence and legiti-
macy, to interpret and apply the Constitution.
Finally, in the context of governmental actions that burden core
constitutional rights, the application of ad hoc doctrinal analysis is
extremely dangerous. It gives courts open-ended discretion to up-
hold governmental action if the government's reasons for acting
seem sufficiently weighty to the reviewing court, and over time it
tends to lead to the evisceration of the underlying rights."' This criti-
cism extends both to ad hoc balancing in general, and more specifi-
cally to ad hoc analysis regarding any component of a doctrinal test,
such as the identification of compelling interests.66 Indeed, there
may be little difference between these modes of analysis since in prac-
tice in the strict scrutiny cases discussed above, the question the
courts seem to be asking is whether the governmental interest at issue
is sufficiently compelling or worthy to justify this particular use of ra-
cial classifications-which is at bottom simply a question of balancing.
These concerns about ad hoc analysis are raised in the context ofju-
dicial evaluation of benign race-based actions because there is a great
deal of continuing societal disagreement about the propriety of such
actions. As a consequence, there is a possibility that judges and other
" Recall that the strict scrutiny test requires a court to determine if the government's ac-
tions advance a compelling interest, and are narrowly tailored to advance that interest. See supra
note 8 and accompanying text. Indeed, all three tiers of scrutiny require courts to evaluate
both governmental ends and governmental means.
"This is not to suggest that ad hoc balancing is neverjustified in constitutional law. Indeed,
in my view ad hoc balancing is inevitable when the constitutional rights at issue are peripheral
and (which may be saying the same thing) the limits on governmental power are less severe
than in cases where the core of a constitutional provision is threatened by a governmental ac-
tion.
'6 The classic critique of ad hoc balancing is of course T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in theAge of Balanng 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). For an exposition of the idea that balancing
tends to eviscerate core constitutional rights, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the
(D)Evolution of ConstitutionalDoctrine, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 961,993-1001 (1998).
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decision makers will employ ad hoc analysis to justify and uphold
race-conscious governmental decision making, thereby undermining
the lesson of the Supreme Court's decisions that such programs
should be considered highly suspect, and presumptively unconstitu-
tional. Such concerns almost certainly underlie the broad statements
to be found in Supreme Court opinions suggesting that race-
conscious programs must be reserved for narrow, remedial settings.67
The ultimate implication of these arguments seems clear: in the
context of true strict scrutiny analysis, the identification of compel-
ling interests should not, as a matter of constitutional theory, be an
entirely ad hoc policy analysis. Instead, it should be a legal question,
rooted in constitutional principles, and in particular in the constitu-
tional text at issue in the case being decided-i.e., the constitutional
text that is the source of the asserted right. Put differently, and
probably more accurately, the identification of compelling interests
should be understood as an interpretive exercise, aimed at determin-
ing the contours and limits of a constitutional right. This form of
analysis, which I have described elsewhere as "limited purpose analy-
sis," meets the objections to ad hoc analysis described above, and
therefore provides sufficient protection to core constitutional rights
while also protecting the institutional legitimacy of the courts.'
The above analysis may seem peculiar, but it in fact makes perfect
sense when one remembers the fundamental nature of rights.
Rights, after all, operate and are best understood not as free floating
entitlements belonging to individuals, but as specifically defined limits
on governmental power and governmental motives. Seen through
this lens, compelling interest analysis becomes not an ad hoc inquiry
into the strengths of governmental policies, but rather an effort to
determine the precise content and shape of the limits on state
authority imposed by the Constitution by interpreting constitutional
text. Only thus can the idea of rights as trumps be reconciled with
the reality that rights as baldly stated do not impose absolute limits on
governmental power.
Therefore, if the Supreme Court is serious that benign, race-
conscious governmental programs are as constitutionally suspect, and
should be subject to the same level of scrutiny, as other types of ac-
tions subject to strict scrutiny such as Jim Crow segregation and con-
tent-based restrictions on speech, then the universe of compelling in-
terests sufficient to justify race-conscious government actions should
be very limited, and that universe should be identified on the basis of
67 See, e.g., City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Cf Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment), cert. granted sub nor. Adarand v. Mineta, 121 S. CL 1401 (2001),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 122 S. Ct. 511 (2001).
For a more detailed exposition of this argument, see Bhagwvat, supra note 43, at 338-51.
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constitutionally rooted principles. So far, then, it would appear that
in the debate among the courts of appeals, the better position is the
Hopwood/Lutheran Church view that compelling interests should be
identified as a matter of law and that only remedial interests qualify as
compelling in the context of challenges to race-conscious decision
making. The difficulty is that the position advocated by the Fifth Cir-
cuit and to some extent the District of Columbia Circuit, that only
remedial interests qualify as compelling, and in particular, that the
government has no interest in advancing racial diversity, has been
justified only by citations to intermittent statements in assorted Su-
preme Court opinions, which themselves are largely unsupported by
any interpretive analysis. Neither the appellate courts nor the Su-
preme Court has explained why, as a matter of constitutional inter-
pretation, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment should be understood to preclude the government from
seeking to foster a minimum level of racial diversity within its pro-
grams and institutions-i.e., to foster a desegregated society. Indeed,
one would think that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
would lead to precisely the opposite conclusion, that ending segrega-
tion-whether de facto or de jure--qualifies as among the most
compelling of governmental interests." So, the argument set forth
here does not justify the results in the Hopwood or Lutheran Church
cases. Interestingly, however, it does undermine the reasoning, and
probably also the results, in the Wittmer and Hunter cases, because the
theoretical approach outlined here is entirely inconsistent with the
Seventh and Ninth Circuit's view that the search for compelling in-
terests requires an ad hoc evaluation of the importance of a govern-
mental policy. And it is difficult to imagine how the compelling in-
terests identified in those cases-running a prison program and
conducting educational research, respectively-can be derived from
equal protection principles. The Second Circuit's Brewer decision,
however, seems entirely consistent with this analysis because the
compelling interest in that case, reducing racial isolation, seems to
have obvious roots in equal protection principles.
The above discussion is probably something of a red herring.
One suspects that most courts (and even most members of the Su-
preme Court) are not really comfortable with the idea that affirma-
tive action, and other race-conscious actions that benefit racial mi-
norities, are truly "the same as," and as constitutionally suspect as Jim
Crow segregation. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that most judges
Note that this is quite a different statement from suggesting that de facto segregation in
itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment, which under modem caselaw it clearly does not.
This is also not to say that any and all attempts to create racial diversity through explicitly racial
preferences is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. For example, I am dubious if the
Equal Protection Clause permits states to engage in pure racial balancing through a system of
racial quotas. SeeTuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.Sd 698, 705 (4th Cir. 1999).
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consider such benign race-based actions to be more problematic than
gender discrimination, which is after all subject to only intermediate
scrutiny. Put in terms of compelling interest analysis, it is hard to
believe that the universe of governmental interests that would justify
racial classifications benefiting minorities is really the same as the
universe that would justify malignant discrimination against minori-
ties. It is to this question-the purported equivalence under the
Court's current doctrine of all official uses of racial classifications-
that I now turn.
B. Benign and Malignant "Discrimination"
The Problem of Equivalence
Under the Court's current doctrine, any governmental action
which takes account of race is subject to exactly the same level of con-
stitutional review, strict scrutiny. This is true regardless of who the
governmental body is, and what racial groups are harmed or bene-
fited by the action. This doctrinal position would seem to suggest
that at least from a constitutional perspective, benign race-conscious
actions really are indistinguishable from racial discrimination as tra-
ditionally understood.7 ' And indeed, there is support from at least
' See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001); cf. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532
(1996) (recognizing "a strong presumption that gender classifications are invalid") (internal
citations omitted).
" Here (and throughout this Article) I assume, perhaps heroically, that it is possible to
meaningfully distinguish between benign and invidious discrimination. Admittedly, however, it
is far from obvious how exactly to formulate a legal rule distinguishing between these types of
race-conscious actions. Perhaps the most common approach is to distinguish between actions
that harm members of racial minority groups who have been historically discriminated against,
and actions that benefit members of such groups. See, e.g., PeterJ. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine
and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 26-37 (2000). Under current Supreme Court precedent, in drawing this distinction one
presumably would focus on whether the purposeofa particular action is to harm or benefit such
persons. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (holding that statute that operated
to redress past economic discrimination against women by paying them slightly higher old-age
benefits than similarly situated men was not unconstitutional); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (holding that without evidence of a discriminatory purpose, a police entrance test
was not unconstitutional simply because African-Americans failed at a higher rate than whites).
Notice that under such an approach, most government actions segregating people by race
would be invidious, but in some instances (consider the example of segregating prisoners dur-
ing a prison race riot) segregation might be considered non-invidious because it was not in-
tended to harm minorities.
Another, perhaps more promising, approach would be to focus on what Deborah Hell-
man describes as the "expressive content" or the "social meaning" of the governmental policy,
and to find invidious only policies that express the meaning that the government "values some
of us more than others." Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85
MINN. L. REv. 1, 3, 13 (2000), citing Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Deci-
sions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). See also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-48 (1993). As Professor
Hellman convincingly argues, such an approach does seem to harmonize well with the caselaw
and with our instincts about the nature and purposes of equal protection.
Finally, the distinction between invidious and benign race-based actions might also be
drawn based on whether the majority-race on the relevant governmental decision making body
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some members of the Court for precisely such a view.72 In practice,
however, it seems clear that most members of the Court do not be-
lieve in this purported equivalence, for obvious reasons relating to
the historical context and purposes surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
in Adarand goes out of its way to emphasize that in this context strict
scrutiny is not fatal in fact, and that the government will sometimes
have sufficient reason to engage in race-based action." And yet, as
Justice Ginsburg points out in her Adarand dissent, the Court's deci-
sions since its infamous Korematsu opinion firmly establish that when
a racial classification does harm previously-discriminated-against mi-
norities, such a classification is automatically invalid.74 Obviously, be-
hind the facade of doctrinal unity, something is lurking.
The lack of equivalence between these two types of race-conscious
actions is also evident from the decisions of the courts of appeals.
Wittmer v. Peters is a prime example. In Wittmer, the Seventh Circuit,
in an opinion by Judge Posner, upheld a hiring policy favoring an Af-
rican-American candidate at a prison "boot camp" program, because
of the empirically proven need for African-American supervisors in
such a program given that a large majority (sixty-eight percent) of the
inmates in the camp were African-American. 75 Presumably this is be-
cause the minority inmates would not have cooperated with an all-
white supervisory group. But now, switch the races. Imagine a pri-
marily white prison population, and a prison system which grants hir-
ing preferences to white guards and supervisors because of the in-
mates' hostility to African-Americans in those positions. It seems
extremely unlikely that any court would uphold such an action in this
day and age, and there is in fact support in the Court's caselaw for
the proposition that a government may not make decisions which
take account of, and effectuate, private racial prejudice.76 Similarly, it
was burdening itself or others. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 ("The concern that a political ma-
jority will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions
or incomplete facts would seem to militate for... the application of heightened judicial scru-
tiny in this case."). In any event, while a full resolution of this question is beyond the scope of
this paper, like Justice Marshall, I have no doubt that in most cases the distinction between be-
nign and invidious discrimination will not be difficult to draw. See id. at 551-55 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that a "profound difference" exists between actions that are racist and
actions seeking to remedy prior racism).
7 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) ("In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is
just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial
discrimination, plain and simple.").
SId. at 237; see also id. at 229-30 (suggesting again that the government may be able tojustify
race-conscious actions if there is a sufficiently compelling interest).
7 Id. at 275 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
7 Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1996).
'6 The primary support for this view is Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (striking down
decision awarding custody of child after divorce to father, because mother entered into an in-
terracial marriage and therefore child raised in household would encounter societal prejudice).
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is difficult to imagine the Ninth Circuit in Hunter upholding a school
admissions program that disadvantaged minorities on the basis of the
need for educational research. Indeed, one wonders how the Brewer
court would have reacted had the school transfer program in that
case been challenged by a minority student who was denied the abil-
ity to transfer schools because of her race.77
Thus courts quite clearly are more willing to uphold benign racial
classifications in the face of an equal protection challenge than they
would be to uphold traditional discrimination. This raises the ques-
tion of what it means for the Court to say that the levels of constitu-
tional scrutiny for these two types of governmental actions are "the
same." Because in practice, they are not the same. One type of ac-
tion-true, invidious discrimination-is per se, or virtually per se, un-
constitutional;7 the other-benign race-based action-is not. There-
fore, in the affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts appear to have created a new tier of scrutiny, called
strict scrutiny but different from the kind of strict scrutiny applied to
other presumptively unconstitutional government actions, including,
notably, invidious discrimination.79 At a minimum, this level of scru-
tiny, which might be called relaxed strict scrutiny, permits govern-
ments to offer a wider range of governmental interests to justify their
actions than might be available in other contexts, especially in com-
parison to invidious discrimination, where essentially no governmen-
tal interests are considered sufficiently compelling to survive review.
This may not, however, be the full extent of the differences between
Judge Posner indeed acknowledges this point in Wittmer, citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16
(1958) for the proposition; but he considers his case distinguishable. Perhaps, but I suspect
that the primary distinction is the races of the various participants. The Wittmerresult is particu-
larly striking because Judge Posner is hardly known as a champion of affirmative action and
similar programs. Indeed, the Hopwood majority relied heavily on an article previously pub-
lished byJudge (then Professor) Posner in support of its reasoning. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946
& n.30 (citing Richard Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment
of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 12 (1974)).
In Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 377-81 (W.D. Ky.
2000), the court was faced with precisely this issue, and ruled (unsurprisingly) that the exclu-
sion of African-American students from a magnet school in order to retain racial diversity in the
student body was unconstitutional.
, This qualification is necessary because of the possibility that in the face of some sudden
social emergency such as the much-mooted possibility of a prison race riot, some race-conscious
action might be upheld. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment); Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919. For rea-
sons I have already addressed, however, I question whether race-conscious action in such a set-
ting (such as temporarily segregating prisoners in the face of a riot) can be classified as dis-
crimination, with its requirement of invidious intent. See supra note 64. And if the
government's response to a crisis were found to be motivated by invidious intent, I have no
doubt that it would be struck down today. But see Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214.
The Court's creation of a new tier of review in the affirmative action context appears to
parallel its possible creation of a new tier of seemingly heightened intermediate scrutiny in the
context of gender discrimination. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding
that parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" for that action).
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the new and the traditional strict scrutiny. Perhaps the differences go
so far that the Court does not believe that the universe of govern-
mental interests that might justify benign, race-conscious action is
limited. Rather, perhaps the Court would accept an ad hoc analysis
of governmental interests in this context, as was utilized by the Witt-
mer and Hunter courts. In other words, perhaps the Court does not
consider benign racial "discrimination" to be true discrimination at
all, and thus not as constitutionally problematic and not so close to
the core of what the Equal Protection Clause prohibits, as to justify
"limited purpose" analysis. In effect, this would equate the new tier
of scrutiny-which might then be called "ad hoc strict scrutiny"-with
a form of intermediate review, albeit a heightened one where there is
a "thumb on the scale" pushing towards invalidityY0 Ultimately, the
Court should and must resolve this ambiguity to provide some clear
direction as to the constitutional status of race-conscious governmen-
tal programs. Until the Court does, the division among the courts of
appeals is likely to persist and possibly increase, since there is little
basis within the Court's jurisprudence for choosing among these pos-
sibilities.
CONCLUSION: BACKTO THE BASICS
Having waded through the doctrinal swamp that is modern equal
protection law, it is time to take a step back. There is now a well-
developed jurisprudence, in both the Supreme Court and at the ap-
pellate level, addressing the constitutionality under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of benign, race-conscious governmental programs. One
would think-at least if one were not a constitutional lawyer-that
the basic question these cases would address would be the following:
under what circumstances, and for what reasons, may a government
take account of race in its decision making? Yet remarkably, an ex-
amination of the cases reveals almost no sustained attention to this
issue. The Hopwood and Wittmer courts did address this question
forthrightly, and reached diametrically opposite results: Hopwood
concluded that only when the government is seeking to remedy spe-
cific, past discrimination by the precise governmental body whose ac-
tions are being challenged may it take account of race; Wittmer con-
cluded that the government may take account of race whenever it has
a good, strong public policy reason for doing so. No other appellate
decision, however, has given the same kind of careful consideration
"See Bhagvat, supra note 43, at 311. Notice that under this view, the Court's analysis of af-
firmative action is edging towards the same kind of scrutiny as its review of gender discrimina-
tion, which also appears to be some sort of an ad hoc strict scrutiny, or heightened intermediate
scrutiny review. See supra note 79. Deborah Hellman argues that if affirmative action is not true
discrimination then it should not be subject to any scrutiny, see Hellman, supra note 71, at 17. I
think, however, that Hellman goes too far in suggesting that the Equal Protection Clause places
no limits on official use of benign racial classifications.
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to the question. The Lutheran Church, Hunter, and Brewer decisions
skirted the question, resolving the narrow issues before them but fail-
ing to adopt an analytical framework. Still other decisions such as
Wessmann and Tuttle simply avoided the difficult question altogether,
focusing instead on esoteric issues of means tailoring. And most re-
markably, no decision of the Supreme Court has directly addressed
this basic question. Instead, the Supreme Court's entire modem ju-
risprudence in this area has been one of adopting and inventing
various tiered standards of scrutiny.
There is something wrong with a jurisprudence that fails to come
to grips with the basic issues that any common-sense view would sug-
gest must dominate analysis in an area of law. In fact, not only has
the Court failed to address the basic question of when governments
may take account of race, it has studiously avoided that question by
adopting an abstract doctrinal standard-strict scrutiny-which
masks fundamental differences regarding this question within the
governing majority of the Court." The fact that the Court's primary
doctrinal move in this area, the expansion of strict scrutiny review,
fails to provide any guidance regarding this basic question reveals the
bankruptcy of modem equal protection doctrine. Indeed, the exten-
sion of strict scrutiny review to all race-conscious decisions has even
less meaning than would appear, because it seems apparent that a
majority of the Court does not believe strict scrutiny review in the
context of benign racial classifications will operate the same way as
review of invidious classifications. Thus, what little guidance the in-
vidious discrimination cases might provide as to the permissibility of
racial classifications cannot be extended to the benign discrimination
context. As a result, the Supreme Court's equal protection jurispru-
dence has reached a crossroads, where if it is to give meaningful an-
swers to the constitutional issues of the day, it must retreat from the
Court's current single-minded focus on abstract tests, and delve into
the real questions underlying these cases. Meanwhile, the tiers of
scrutiny proliferate.
"I Compare Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995), cert. granted sub nom. Adarand v.
Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 122 S. Ct. 511 (2001) (em-
phasizing permissibility of race-conscious remedies for previous discrimination), with id. at 239
(Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) (opposing remedial use of race-
conscious programs), and id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (denouncing all "government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign
prejudice").
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